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
9 October 1975
NSA & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-16

KIQ-16: What progress have the Soviets made in development of follow-on antiship missile systems? Include the characteristic of the guidance systems.

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.


A. Overall Performance Evaluation.



25X1X5

& NSA 25X3

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods.




25X1X5


& NSA
25X3

KIQ-16 - 1

25X1D0e



25X1X5



B. Production Programs.


1. CIA -- Collected, processed, and disseminated data on antiship missiles to other analytic organizations in the Community. CIA also produced several finished intelligence products, including assessments of the SS-N-9, SS-N-12 and AS-4/6. CIA did not have a specific production commitment under this KIQ.

2. Navy -- Produced several general publications on antiship missiles thru the auspices of DIA. Navy met its production commitment under this KIQ.

3. Air Force -- Produced a handbook on air-to-surface antiship missiles and a more detailed study of the Backfire ASM. These were produced through DIA. Air Force met its production commitment under this KIQ.

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3



KIQ-16 - 2

25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-18

KIQ-18: What is the status of Soviet RDT&E on, and what progress is being made toward deployment of and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance system?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.


A. Overall Performance Evaluation

There was substantial progress toward answering this KIQ. Most of the more important questions were answered in single agency publications.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods.

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3



C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives.

Most of the important questions contained in this KIQ were substantially answered.

PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS.


A. Collection Programs.

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3




25X1X5



KIQ-18 - 1

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B. Production Programs.


all met their production objectives for this KIQ.

25X1X1

& NSA 25X3

2. No interagency report assessing the military capability of Soviet satellite-borne ocean surveillance systems was written, but the Navy did produce a paper on the subject which substantially met that production requirement.

KIQ-18 - 2

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25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-25

KIQ-25: What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.

A. Overall Performance Evaluation.

Substantial progress was made during the past year toward satisfying this KIQ. Collectors, processors, and producers of intelligence in support of this KIQ have either met or progressed significantly toward meeting the objectives. In addition, there has been considerable current support provided to the MBFR negotiating team using the developing KIQ-25 data bases.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection Objectives and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods.

25X1D0e

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

25X1D1a
& NSA 25X3

[REDACTED]

25X1D1a
& NSA 25X3

25X1D0e

25X1D1a

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Exploitation Objectives.

25X1D0e

[REDACTED]

KIQ-25 - 1

25X1D0e

25X1D1a

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3

D. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives.

A data base of manpower and equipment strengths has been created and is already being used in support of MBFR negotiations. An automated Soviet and Warsaw Pact air and ground order of battle file has been developed and is being maintained in DIA and contains community judgments of equipment and personnel strengths of units to the regimental level of detail. Numerous reports have been developed in direct support of the US MBFR delegation. In addition, an interagency memorandum establishing official US estimated personnel strengths of Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NATO guidelines area was produced. A coordinated assessment of Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear force levels was also produced.

PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS.

A. Collection Programs.

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
& NSA 25X3

3. Clandestine reporting -- CIA continued to collect information important to answering this KIQ.

4. Defector reporting obtained from both the Defector Reception Center and the US Army made a substantial contribution to judgments on personnel and equipment strengths.


KIQ-25 - 2

25X1X1




B. Exploitation Programs.

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& NSA 25X3



C. Production Programs.

1. CIA has provided direct support to the MBFR negotiating team in coordination with DIA. In addition, they, with DIA, were the contributors to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: Estimated Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area.

25X6A 2. DIA has provided direct support to the MBFR negotiating team in coordination with CIA. In addition, they, with CIA, were the contributors to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: Estimated Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area. Input from the new DIA branch in support of production for this KIQ was evident in the production of the coordinated CIA/DIA assessment of nuclear force levels. DIA automated files



KIQ-25 - 3

25X1D1a & NSA



4. In addition to the above, CIA and DIA contributed to the Department of Defense NATO Fact Book which is used in support of the MBFR negotiations.

KIQ-25 - 4

25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-26

KIQ-26: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for theater war?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.

A. Overall Performance Evaluation.

Community effort with regard to this KIQ resulted in completion of a National Intelligence Estimate and substantial progress toward the completion of a US version of MC 161/76. These documents have met many objectives of this KIQ. In addition, there were a number of single agency publications which have contributed substantially to answering this KIQ. Nonetheless, some important questions remain substantially unanswered.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection Objectives and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods.

[REDACTED] 25X1X1
and to a lesser degree interrogation of defectors provided most of the important information in support of this KIQ. Photography provided information indicating the extent to

& NSA

25X1X1

C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives.

NIE 11-14-75 was produced and substantial progress was made toward completion of MC 161, although neither was completed by the end of FY 75. [REDACTED]

25X1D0e

25X1D0e

KIQ-26 - 1

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Numerous single agency memoranda were produced within the community which helped meet some of the objectives of this KIQ.

PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS.

A. Collection Programs.

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

25X1D1a
& NSA

[REDACTED]

25X1D0e

[REDACTED]

4. Defector Reporting from the Defector Reception Center and the military services made a contribution to judgments on training and related matters.

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

B. Production Programs.

The community acting in concert contributed to the production of NIE 11-14-75 and the draft of the US MC 161/76, and, to the extent that these documents answered questions posed by this KIQ, fulfilled the production objectives. Input from the new DIA branch in support of production for this KIQ was evident in contributions to both estimates.

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25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-27

KIQ-27: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces the theater war?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.


A. Overall Performance Evaluation.

Community effort with regard to this KIQ resulted in completion of a National Intelligence Estimate and a version of MC 161/76 which have met many objectives of this KIQ. In addition, there were a number of single agency publications which have contributed substantially to answering this KIQ. Nonetheless, some important questions remain substantially unanswered.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods.

25X1D1a

25X1X1



25X1X1

& NSA
25X1X1

25X1X1

C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives.

NIE 11-14-75 was produced and substantial progress was made toward completion of MC 161 although neither was completed by the end of FY 75. There are still gaps in finished intelligence on some aspects of this KIQ which were not covered in the community documents. Several single agency memoranda were produced within the community which helped meet some of the objectives of this KIQ. A shortage of analysts precluded a more nearly complete set of answers to this KIQ.

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PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS.

A. Collection Programs.

[REDACTED]

25X1X1

25X1D1a

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[REDACTED]

25X1D0e

[REDACTED]

4. Defector Reporting from the Defector Reception Center and the military services made a contribution to judgments on training and mobilization.

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

B. Production Programs.

The community acting in concert contributed to the production of NIE 11-14-75 and the draft of the US MC 161/76 and to the extent that these documents answered questions posed by this KIQ fulfilled the production objectives. Input from the new DIA branch in support of production for this KIQ was evident.

KIQ 27 - 2 -

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25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-28

KIQ-28: What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT.


A. Overall Performance Evaluation.

Although some effort toward answering this question was reflected in the recently completed NIE 11-14-75, this question remains basically unanswered.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection Objectives and Relative Contributions of Collection Methods.

25X1X1

& NSA



C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives.

Most of the important aspects of this KIQ remain unanswered because of a shortage of community resources applied to the problem.

PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS.

A. Collection Programs.

25X1X1



KIQ-28 - 1

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CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

25X1D1a

& NSA

[REDACTED]

25X1D0e

[REDACTED]

25X1X1

[REDACTED]

5. Defector reporting from the Defector Reception Center and the military services provided some limited information for this KIQ.

B. Production Programs.

25X1X5

[REDACTED]

KIQ-28 - 2

25X1X5

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FY-75 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: KIQ-65

KIQ-65: What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty?

Give particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely to be so. Contentious as to jeopardize prospects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to the United States.

PART I -- OVERALL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

This KIQ was substantially answered by both collectors and producers for the negotiating events which took place during the reporting period. Reporting and production on foreign attitudes and intentions in these negotiations significantly aided the US negotiating team at the formal sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas and Geneva, and at a host of informal meetings.

PART II -- EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH COLLECTIONS METHOD AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM.

25X1X1

& NSA
25X3

KIQ-65 - 1

B. Production Programs.

1. CIA -- Almost completely met the production objectives in regard to this KIQ. That production included in-depth reporting on the LOS position of twenty-nine countries, studies on special LOS problem areas, and an extensive biographic briefing package, which were prepared for the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea in direct support of the U.S. negotiating team.

2. State/INR -- produced a substantial number of memoranda which helped meet the production objectives of this KIQ.

KIQ-65 - 2

25X1X5

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